3,1862, Buell wrote to Halleck.,[1] giving Mm his view of the military situation, almost in the language cited above, and suggesting that the attack on the centre should be made by two gun-boat expeditions, with 20,000 men on the two rivers. There should also be rapid movements of troops to the points where the railroad from Louisville and Bowling Green to Columbus crosses the rivers. Halleck, however, had his hands full of the affairs of Missouri, where everything was in a very disorganized condition.[3] He wrote[8] to Buell on the 6th that he could not put into the field in Kentucky over 10,000 or 11,000 men. Moreover he wholly disapproved of the plan suggested by Buell. " It strikes me," lie said, "that to operate from Louisville and [also from] Paducah or Cairo against an enemy at Bowling Green is a plain case of exterior lines, like that of McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each of the exterior columns is superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times in a hundred." General Halleck's point of strategy may have been sound, although the facilities afforded by the rivers for retreat in the event of the troops sent by water encountering a superior force may have been overlooked by him ; but, besides the probability that the United

States forces would be decidedly superior in strength to any troops they might encounter, it was plain that there was no other way than that suggested by Gen-

[1] 7 W. R., 528.
[2] Halleck to McClellan ; Dec. 6, 1861 : 8 W, R., 408, 409.
[3] 7 W. R., 533. He also wrote to the same effect to the President on January 6, 1862. //., 532, 533.